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Abstract The survival enhancing propensity (SEP) account has a crucial role to
play in the analysis of proper function. However, a central feature of the account, its
specification of the proper environment to which functions are relativized, is seriously
underdeveloped. In this paper, I argue that existent accounts of proper environment
fail because they either allow too many or too few characters to count as proper func-
tions. While SEP accounts retain their promise, they are unworkable because of their
inability to specify this important feature. However, I suggest that this problem can
be overcome by the application of a new strategy for specifying proper environment
that is grounded in the operation of natural selection and I conclude by offering a first
approximation of such an account.
Keywords Biological function · Proper function · Serendipitous malfunction ·
Survival enhancing propensity
1 Introduction
Since Wright’s (1973, 1976) influential work on the subject, etiological or historical
accounts of biological function have been widely accepted. Under these accounts, the
biological function of a character “is the property it has or had in virtue of which it was
promoted by natural selection in the past” (Walsh 1996, p. 533). According to many
proponents, the success of etiological accounts come at the expense of their main rival:
ahistorical accounts, many of which claim (roughly) that “the biological function of a
trait is that property which now contributes to the survival and reproduction of those
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individuals possessing it, irrespective of what its past tokens have done” (Walsh 1996,
p. 533).1
I echo Mitchell (1995) and Walsh (1996) in claiming that historical and ahistor-
ical accounts are not incompatible and so these proponents are mistaken. Although
I have little to add to the arguments given by these authors, I find it highly plausible
that historical and ahistorical accounts do not offer competing analyses but instead
offer answers to the following two different questions. As Nancy Cartwright points
out, “explanations give answers not only to why questions, but also to what questions.
They say of something, what it really is” (1986, p. 203). Like other explanations,
functional ascriptions not only explain why a character is manifested but also identify
the nature of a character by identifying its functional role in its proper environment.2
Thus, “function is used in different scientific projects, there is not a single, univocal
explanatory task for which such language is employed in scientific practice” (Mitchell
1995, p. 51).
In this paper, I intend to take advantage of Mitchell and Walsh’s insight by explor-
ing what I think is the most promising ahistorical analysis of function available: John
Bigelow and Robert Pargetter’s SEP account. According to SEP, something has a (bio-
logical) function just in case it confers on the organs or organisms that possess it a
propensity that is survival enhancing in that organ or organism’s proper environment.3
While the etiological account may successfully answer why questions, I think that
some version of Bigelow and Pargetter’s SEP account will provide the best answers
to what questions concerning biological functions and as such, it is in our best interest
to develop the SEP account.
However, significant development is needed if the SEP account is to deliver on its
potential as a way of understanding the nature of function. Although Bigelow and Par-
getter identify several places where the need for development is great, I will focus on
the specification of the proper environment: the environment to which our judgment
concerning whether or not a survival enhancing propensity (sep) is conferred by a
character (and so whether a character is properly functioning) is to be relativized. This
specification is problematic because of Bigelow and Pargetter’s identification of proper
environment in terms that “patently involve the notion of proper function” (Plantinga
1993, p. 206): “the natural habitat of the item in question will be a functioning, healthy,
interconnected system of organs or parts of the type usual for the species in question”
(Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, p. 192). As is indicated by the inclusion of ‘healthy,’
1 Noteworthy exceptions to this characterization of ahistorical accounts are causal role accounts like those
offered by Cummins (1975, 1983). These accounts analyze functions in terms of capacities without men-
tion of survival or reproduction. However, there has been some discussion as to whether or not Cummins’
account has the resources to analyze proper function (see Millikan 1984; Griffiths 1993). While it would be
necessary to address this kind of account in order to fully motivate the survival enhancing propensity (SEP)
account of function I will endorse, doing so falls outside the scope of this paper, which is only intended to
solve a specific problem with this account.
2 A similar observation is made by Bardon (2007, p. 153). In fact, the ability to answer what questions
appears to be just what is meant when proponents of ahistorical accounts claim that their views are forward
looking.
3 Bigelow and Pargetter use the term ‘natural habitat’ while I use ‘proper environment’ in accordance with
more recent work on the subject. I consider these terms to be interchangeable.
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Bigelow and Pargetter clearly intend for ‘functioning’ to mean ‘properly functioning’
and so proper environment is defined in terms of proper function. Because of this,
SEP’s use of proper environment in the analysis of function is viciously circular.4
Though their stated analysis fails, Bigelow and Pargetter also give several indi-
cations of alternate conceptions of proper environment. In my second section, I will
briefly discuss the identification of proper environment with current environment. This
conception is popular with critics of the SEP account (see for example Walsh 1996;
Mossio et al. 2009) and is also suggested by Bigelow and Pargetter when, on p. 192
of Functions, they address the possibility of sudden changes in environment. I will
briefly present several objections against this understanding and conclude that we
should instead prefer another conception of proper environment.
In my third and fourth sections, I examine a modification to SEP made by Adrian
Bardon, the only proponent of the SEP account to address the problem of proper envi-
ronment. Bardon suggests that a temporal requirement should be incorporated for-
mally into the account. Such a requirement would specify the frequency with which
environmental factors must occur and the duration for which an environment must
persist in order to be a proper environment. Bigelow and Pargetter also suggest this
approach, in the form of an unspecified threshold that an environment must cross
before being considered proper. While interesting, I argue that, as a result of the way
his temporal requirement is specified, Bardon’s account construes proper function too
narrowly by excluding characters with intuitive proper functions that are unique to
groups smaller than species. Light revisions of Bardon’s temporal requirement con-
strue proper function too broadly and so admit intuitive malfunctions. It seems to me
that these objections are fatal to his account.
If I am correct, then all existing conceptions of proper environment fail. This is a
serious and underappreciated problem for proponents of SEP accounts and, given that
SEP accounts are the best way of answering what questions concerning function, this
is a problem for any friend of functions. Fortunately, I do not think that this problem
is an insurmountable one and, to support this, I will conclude by briefly suggesting a
selection-based strategy by which a successful temporal threshold might be developed.
According to this strategy, proper environments are those in which selection in favor
of the trait in question occurs. I argue that the selection based strategy that I suggest
is flexible enough to attribute proper functions to characters manifested in groups of
all sizes but is also rigid enough to exclude intuitive cases of malfunction.
2 Is proper environment identical to current environment?
It is tempting to generate a straightforward SEP account of function by identifying
proper environment with current environment. As I mentioned before, critics of SEP
accounts often do this and as these critics point out, it is not a promising approach.
I agree with these critics and, in this section, I will give two objections against the
current environment interpretation of Bigelow and Pargetter’s SEP account. If these
objections are not fatal, then they are strong reasons to prefer a new approach.
4 Alvin Plantinga gives this argument on p. 206 of his 1993.
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The cracks in the current environment interpretation begin to show when we con-
sider what happens immediately after a change in environment. Bigelow and Pargetter
note that, in these cases, it will be ambiguous for a period of time which environment
we should consider the natural one: is it the environment of the recent past or the one
that was only recently occupied by the trait? The current environment interpretation
resolves this ambiguity by siding with the recently occupied environment in every
case. As I will show, this comes at a high price. Barden notes that “one problem that
[Bigelow and Pargetter’s] propensity analysis is intended to solve is that of how to
distinguish an organism’s proper environment from a habitat that, by sheer chance,
might be the organism’s actual habitat for a period of time” (2007, p. 56).
However by identifying the proper environment with the actual one, the current
environment interpretation is unable to solve this problem. As a result, function is
relativized to whatever environment an organ or organism finds itself in no matter how
short a time this environment is occupied. For example, we are forced to ask ourselves
what function bile secretion performs in a liver that has recently been removed by a
surgeon from an organ donor for transplant. Once the liver is in the recipient, we must
again reconsider the functions of the liver’s characters relativized to the environment
of its new host. A similar case involving organisms might have us relativizing func-
tions to the chimpanzee enclosure at the zoo or the test cages in a laboratory. It is
clear that in the cases I have mentioned, organs or organisms are not in their proper
environments but only in environments that they, by chance, occupy for a period of
time.5
As is indicated by my examples, the common environment interpretation appears to
wrongly categorize paradigmatically artificial environments as natural environments.
This is so because it seems that natural environment is just a synonym for proper envi-
ronment. This is indicated by the use of these terms interchangeably in the literature on
the SEP account (see footnote 3) and is also borne out by our intuition that characters
have proper functions in their natural environments. It would seem that if an organ or
organism’s current environment is identical to its proper environment in every case,
then this distinction between natural and artificial environments breaks down.
However, my argument against the current environment approach does not hang on
this point. Intuitively natural examples are commonly available that require organisms
to rapidly change environments. For example, Canadian Geese (Branta Canadensis)
migrate annually from breeding grounds in northern Canada to as far south as South
Carolina, passing through a wide variety of environments in a short period of time. The
common environment interpretation requires that we relativize functions in migration
cases to every environment an organism passes through no matter how short a time
it is occupied. As these organisms progress along their migration route, old environ-
ments are replaced as the proper environment as new ones are occupied and function
ascriptions must be relativized in each case to the new proper environment. Similarly,
5 It might be argued that function ascriptions do not change in relation to every new environment, but
instead only change in those environments that are different enough from their successors. In this way, the
force of my argument might be blunted. However, it seems that all that is required for an environment to
be different enough is for it to impact proper function. As a result, this suggestion becomes trivial. Not
surprisingly, it is also of no help to the current environment interpretation because this interpretation just
amounts to the claim that the environment an organism is currently in has an impact on proper function.
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when a new mammal is born and so moves from the environment provided by its
mother to some external environment, the current environment interpretation requires
that we reconsider all of the organism’s functions by relativizing them to this new envi-
ronment.6 As in cases involving intuitively artificial environments like those above,
the current environment interpretation violates our intuitions and fails to reflect the
common biological use of function ascriptions by requiring that function ascriptions
change far too quickly. This is because it fails to distinguish between proper environ-
ments and those environments that an organism just happens to occupy for a period
of time.
Because it relativizes functions to environments that are short lived, the current
environment approach is also vulnerable to a second objection. In some short-lived
environments, an intuitive case of malfunction will confer a sep on an organism.
In these cases, intuition and the current environment interpretation part ways to the
detriment of the current environment interpretation. To illustrate, imagine a case where
a miner is trapped underground in a small chamber. In this environment, which has
limited oxygen, pre-existing characters like a very slow heart rate and slow, shallow
respiration would confer on the miner a sep by reducing her need for oxygen. Does
this make it the case that, in this environment, such weak vital signs indicate that her
heart and lungs are functioning properly? I think not. Instead we are inclined to say
that the heart and lungs of the miner are malfunctioning, albeit in a lucky way. If the
current environment approach admits cases like these, often called cases of serendip-
itous malfunction, as genuine instances of proper function then it is too permissive.
Another interpretation should be found.
3 SEP*
In each of my objections above, I argued that the current environment interpretation
failed because it countenanced environments that were too short lived. It might be
tempting, then, to introduce a temporal requirement that would allow us only to select
environments that have persisted for a long enough time. Adrian Bardon suggests just
such a modification to Bigelow and Pargetter’s SEP account that he calls SEP*:
(SEP*) A character of an organ or organism has an n-function iff: the charac-
ter generates survival-enhancing propensities for the organism in circumstances
that have been common both to the activity of the mechanism that produces
the character and to the species to which the character belongs (Bardon 2007,
p. 57).7
This temporal requirement defines proper environment in terms of common
circumstances, which is delimited by a two-fold threshold. Common circumstances
6 While it seems true that the functions of some characters (like the placenta for example) change under
these circumstances, it seems clearly false that the function of every character has the potential to change.
For example, this doesn’t seem to be a possibility for the functional roles played by the heart or the brain.
7 The ‘n’ here stands for naturalistic function in order to distinguish biological functions from common
functions, which are those functions that are ascribed to artifacts.
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must occur for a long enough duration and with enough frequency to first “result in
changes (via accidental mutation and natural selection) to a species’ common genetic
code” and second to be reflected in the genetic mechanism of the character (Bardon
2007, p. 57).8 Call the former condition the ‘code threshold condition’ and the latter
condition the ‘mechanism threshold condition’ for ease of reference. Characters that
generate survival-enhancing propensities in environments that go on to satisfy the
temporal requirement have proper functions right from the start and for as long as
these environments satisfy the temporal requirement and so are proper environments.
However, characters that generate survival enhancing propensities in circumstances
that have occurred too infrequently or for too short a duration to satisfy both the
code and mechanism threshold conditions and so do not go on to satisfy the threshold
requirement are not functions under SEP*. As a result, SEP* is not vulnerable to either
of the objections I urged against the current environment interpretation in Sect. 2.
Even so, there is a significant difficulty with SEP*. Unlike the current environment
interpretation, which was too permissive, SEP* is far too restrictive. The problem is
the code threshold condition. It is not clear that there is such a thing as the common
genetic code of a species. However, I argue in this section that even if this feature
of Bardon’s account is accepted for the sake of argument, the account fails as it is
stated because biologists are not always interested in characters that are shared by an
entire species. Sometimes, the character of concern is distinctive to a subspecies or
even a subpopulation within a species or subspecies. These kinds of characters confer
survival-enhancing propensities evolved in response to selection pressures that are not
shared with the rest of the species. The genetic mechanisms of these characters reflect
the relevant selection pressures, which act on the subspecies or subpopulation (as the
case dictates) but not on the entire species, and so the mechanism threshold condition
is fulfilled. However, because the selection pressures in the environment act only on
the subspecies or subpopulation and not on the species as a whole, these selection
pressures are not reflected in the common genetic code of the species.
While these characters generate survival enhancing propensities, they do not do so
in environments that satisfy the two-fold threshold of the temporal requirement and
so these characters are excluded from proper function by SEP* even though they are
consistent with both the intuitive and common biological use of proper function. In
these cases, the circumstances that give rise to the character of concern will never
be common to the species. Yet, it seems right to consider characters like these to be
instances of proper function even though they fail to satisfy SEP*. So it seems that
SEP* is not a genuine analysis of proper function.
To illustrate this point, consider the species Panthera tigris, which is composed
of eight geographically isolated subspecies that have unique characters evolved in
response to the selection pressures of their significantly different environments. The
Panthera tigris sumatrae subspecies, the Sumatran tiger, has closely spaced stripes
8 There is a trivial sense of “changes to a species common genetic code” where genetic change in any
individual is a change in the species’ common genetic code by virtue of that individual’s membership in the
species. Read this way the code threshold condition allows any serendipitous malfunction to be considered
a proper function, a possibility that Bardon attempts to exclude. This sense is not what the author intends
and so I disregard it.
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that generate a sep by better camouflaging the Sumatran tiger in its dense jungle envi-
ronment and so increasing its ability to stalk and kill prey (Miquelle and Nath 2007).
These stripes have a genetic mechanism that has evolved in response to the unique
selection pressures of the dense jungle.
However, because the rest of the Panthera tigris species does not live in the dense
jungle and so does not share these selection pressures, they are not reflected in the
species’ common genetic code and so do not satisfy the code threshold condition.
The camouflaging function performed by the Sumatran tiger’s closely spaced stripes
cannot be considered an instance of proper function under SEP* because, although
they generate a sep, they do not do so in an environment that satisfies the two-fold
threshold requirement. So they do not do so in a proper environment. This is so in
spite of our strong inclination to consider the camouflaging function of the Sumatran
tiger’s stripes to be an instance of proper function. Because it seems right to consider
this camouflaging function to be a proper function and the dense jungle environment
to be its proper environment, it seems clear that SEP* is too strong.
A similar example shows that subpopulations must also be countenanced. Consider
Dice and Blossom (1937) seminal study, which described significant color variations
in several vertebrate populations inhabiting the Tularosa Basin of New Mexico. This
environment is significant because it exhibits a high degree of geographical varia-
tion over a small area. Within 25 km, the geographical substrate changes from black
basaltic lava to white gypsum dunes. Across this range, Dice and Blossom discov-
ered that the dorsal pelages of pocket mice “ranged from nearly pure black to nearly
pure white, closely matching the substrate on which the mice were caught” (Hoekstra
2006, p. 227). This substrate matching was also observed in fence lizards and has
been strongly linked by several studies to “predation rates by visual avian hunters”
(Hoekstra 2006, p. 227).
Populations of these mice differ in their coloration because of selection pressures
that encourage them to blend into their differently colored environments. While white
mice and black mice share selection pressures of the same kind, they are not to be
mistaken as the same selection pressures. Black mice are pressured to take on the
color of black basaltic lava while white mice are pressured to take on the color of
white gypsum dunes. The differences in the genotypes of each population of mice, as
well as differences manifested in the genetic mechanism of the character, reflect these
different selection pressures. However, neither the selection pressures encouraging
white coloration nor the pressures encouraging black coloration are manifested in the
genetic code of the entire species.9 Thus while the coloration of these populations of
9 It might be pressed that the trait we are interested in is instead a disjunctive one of the form ‘black if
tending to live on lava and white if tending to live on gypsum’. It is open to us to be interested in this
trait, which is more naturally called the substrate-matching coloration trait. However, it seems that any trait
can be paired with a related one in such a way and so this should do nothing to reduce our interest in the
trait discussed. In addition, there are important differences between this trait and the more narrow black
coloration trait. As long as we might be interested only in the black coloration trait and not in related traits
like substrate matching coloration, my argument should be persuasive.
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pocket mice convey a sep, it does not do so in a proper environment as defined by
SEP*.10,11
Because biologists are sometimes interested in the functions of characters mani-
fested uniquely by members of a subspecies or by members of a subpopulation, I think
that SEP* should be generalized to include both and I will examine a generalization
of this kind in my next section. However as an astute referee points out, it might be
tempting to consider the pocket mice in the example above as members of different
subspecies that are delimited by their color and not as subpopulations of a single
species.12 However, a subspecies seems to be a collection of phenotypically similar
populations and we are only discussing one population. Indeed, subspecies are often
defined in contrast to single populations. In addition, the mice in the Tularosa Basin
vary clinally, or in a way that is graduated through space. This variation is a smooth one
that transitions from a predominance of one phenotype to a predominance of another
with vague borders instead of a dramatic hybrid zone between groups (a step cline is
not present) and so it would seem that any division into subspecies would be arbitrary
in its treatment of intermediate cases. However my arguments hangs only on our desire
to attribute functions to characters unique to small sized populations. Because it does
not hang on whether small groups like the black pocket mice of the Tularosa Basin are
classified as subspecies or subpopulations, any reader who is inclined may substitute
‘subspecies’ for ‘subpopulation’ in the pocket mouse example and from here on out.
10 Adaptive coloration like the substrate matching manifested in the pocket mouse is a widespread phe-
nomena. It is not unique to this case. It is so wide spread, in fact, that its study has played a formative role
in evolutionary biology (see Hoekstra 2006).
11 Bardon’s SEP* account relativizes function not only to environment but also to species because it is the
species’ common genetic code that determines proper environment. This is significant because it makes
unrestricted function ascriptions impossible. Under SEP*, we cannot claim that the heart’s function is to
pump blood. We must instead claim that the heart’s function is to pump blood through organisms in proper
environment E, which is defined in relation to species S. As a result, many of our questions about functions
and appeals to function ascriptions as explanations are underspecified. It might be thought that this provides
the basis for a second objection against Bardon, whose theory excludes many of our normal, unqualified,
appeals to function. However, Bardon is not alone in relativizing function to species. He inherits this feature
from Bigelow and Pargetter’s original account, which does so through proper environment in the same way
as SEP*. Etiological accounts also relativize their function ascriptions, though not always to species. This
can be seen in Karen Neander’s influential formulation of the etiological account, which relativizes function
to O and to those organisms that share the ancestors of O.
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X’s type did
to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X
is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection. (1991, p. 174).
As a result, I think that relativization to a population is a ubiquitous, though underdiscussed, feature of
accounts of function in general and so is not a reason to reject Bardon’s account in particular. Instead,
Bardon’s account fails because function should be relativized to groups that are sometimes smaller than
species and this is not possible under Bardon’s account.
12 A subspecies is defined by Mayr and Ashlock as “an aggregate of phenotypically similar populations of
a species inhabiting a geographic subdivision of the range of that species and differing taxonomically from
other populations of that species” (1991, p. 43).
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4 Can SEP be generalized?
In order to accommodate the breadth of biologically interesting functions, a natural
suggestion is to define the code threshold condition more permissively to include
whatever genetic population is relevant to the case. Such a modified code threshold
condition might read “a given selection pressure must occur for a long enough duration
and with enough frequency to result in changes (via accidental mutation and natural
selection) to the common genetic code of the relevant genetic population” and so
require that environmental conditions be common to the genetic population exhibiting
the mechanism. Call this modification Generalized SEP*. Though it would seem that
some version of SEP* lightly modified in this way will provide an adequate analysis
of proper function, I will argue in this section that SEP* cannot be fixed just by taking
into account more types of groups than species.
As a result of permitting smaller genetic populations to fulfill the code threshold
condition, we lose the ability to distinguish between cases of proper function and
intuitive cases of serendipitous malfunction and so succumb to the same arguments
that SEP* was designed to avoid. As a result, Bardon’s population-indexed temporal
requirement fails. If we are to understand proper environment, we must do so in some
other way. While the code threshold condition is not too strong in this case, Generalized
SEP* fails because, like the current environment interpretation, it allows the attribution
of proper function to characters that, according to intuition and common biological
use, are serendipitously malfunctioning. Because its threshold conditions limit the
relevant genetically defined group to species, Bardon’s SEP* account insulates itself
from such instances of serendipitous malfunction. This is so because as the relevant
genetically defined group grows larger, the chance that such a malfunction will fulfill
the threshold requirements decreases.
Bardon argues that if the selection pressures producing a serendipitous malfunction
reach the two-fold threshold of the temporal requirement under SEP*, the serendipitous
malfunction is in actuality an adaptation and so an instance of proper function. This
claim is plausible because of the size of the relevant genetically defined group dealt
with by SEP*, which requires a long duration and high frequency of selection pressures
for change to be affected. Because of the size of the specified population, SEP* has the
virtue of restricting the scope of function to changes and environments on appropriate
evolutionary timescales (which will vary depending on the species) while justifiably
ignoring short lived changes and environments. However if, as has been suggested
above, we are forced to modify SEP* such that the relevant group may be signifi-
cantly smaller than species or subspecies, then this virtue is absent in Generalized
SEP*.
It should be noted that the gene pool relevant to a character of concern shrinks as
we allow the term to be used in relation to characters found only in subspecies and
shrinks even further when we allow the term to be used in relation to characters found
only in subpopulations. Therefore, so does the frequency and duration of selection
pressures required by the temporal requirement, which is defined in relation to the
relevant genetic population. A consequence of reducing the two-fold threshold of the
temporal requirement, as we have done in Generalized SEP*, is that many short lived
123
Synthese
selection pressures have the potential to generate characters that are considered to be
properly functioning.
By reducing the size of the relevant gene pool, we increase the likelihood of ser-
endipitous malfunctions. In these cases, malfunctions like a heart that beats 15 times
a minute, when paired with other malfunctions like elastic holes in the aorta, confer
a sep in contrast with either one of these mutations alone. This is true even though it
is intuitively clear that neither the heart nor the aorta is functioning properly.13 Sub-
populations can be very small: it is claimed, for example, that the minimum viable
population of houseflies (Musca domestica) is five organisms. It is conceivable, though
unlikely, that all of these organisms could exhibit the same serendipitous malfunction
as a result of very short-lived environmental conditions (Reed and Bryant 2000). Imag-
ine that, as the result of some strange heritable mutation, the tracheal sacs responsible
for respiration in all of the members of a population of seven houseflies are perforated,
causing air to leak out when respiration occurs at a normal rate. Imagine also that by
some happy coincidence, a second mutation found in only five of these flies causes
them to respire much more slowly and shallowly than the other members of their spe-
cies and so prevents them from losing catastrophic amounts of air through the holes in
their tracheal sacs. Among those with the perforated tracheal sac mutation, only those
flies that also have the slow and shallow respiration mutation survive to reproduce.
If this case were to obtain, slow and shallow respiration would confer a sep on
the population of surviving houseflies just as it was conferred in the slow heartbeat
case discussed above and in the miner case discussed in Sect. 2. Furthermore, slow
and shallow respiration would satisfy the two-fold temporal requirement because it
is reflected in the genetic mechanism that gives rise to it and is, by random mutation
and natural selection, part of the common code of the genetic population of which we
are concerned, that is, the population of five surviving flies. Therefore, though it is
intuitively clear that this character is a serendipitous malfunction and not an adaptation
as we usually understand it, slow and shallow respiration is considered an instance of
proper function under Generalized SEP*. Surely, though, such serendipitous malfunc-
tions are not instances of proper function no matter what sep they confer. It seems clear
in these cases that a character can satisfy Generalized SEP* and yet not be considered,
either by intuition or in common biological use, an instance of proper function. So,
Generalized SEP* is not a successful analysis of function. It fails because it indexes its
temporal requirement to population size and because it allows any population, however
small, to qualify.
5 A promising strategy
I have argued that both the common environment interpretation of proper environment
and Bardon’s SEP* account (along with its plausible modifications) fail to provide us
13 I echo Plantinga, who first puts forth this style of argument, in claiming that there is no reason to consider
malfunctioning mechanisms that happen to work together to be properly functioning mechanisms. It seems
clear that a heart that beats 15 times a minute is still malfunctioning no matter what SEP it confers. It is not
a function of the heart to behave in this way. The same can be said for any malfunctioning mechanism (see
Plantinga 1993, p. 208). Bigelow and Pargetter expound a similar idea (1987, p. 191).
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with a satisfactory analysis of proper environment. So, all the existing accounts of
proper environment fail. This is bad news both for the friend of SEP accounts and
for the friend of functions because it jeopardizes our ability to answer what questions
about what a function really is. In this section, I will suggest that SEP accounts can be
saved if they apply a new strategy for understanding proper environment. Like Bardon,
I think that proper environment should be specified by way of a temporal requirement.
However, I reject Bardon’s population-based approach in favor of what might be called
a selection-based approach. While Bardon suggests that proper environments are those
that make their mark on the common genetic code of the species, I suggest that proper
environments are those where selection in favor of the trait in question has occurred.
As an example of what a selection-based approach might look like, consider the
following.
(SEPS) A character C of an organ or organism in a population P has a func-
tion iff C generates survival enhancing propensities, for the organ or organism
that has it, in circumstances in which P persists or will go on to persist for an
evolutionarily significant time period.14
The crucial piece of this definition is the phrase ‘evolutionarily significant time period,’
which serves as the temporal requirement that must be met before circumstances can be
considered common. Evolutionarily significant time periods have been clearly defined
by Paul Griffiths in connection with his Modern History account of function, a varia-
tion of the etiological theory, and I think that we can make use of his definition here
as well. Griffiths states that an evolutionarily significant time period is “a period such
that, given the mutation rate at the loci controlling T and the population size, [it is likely
for] sufficient variants for T to have occurred to allow significant regressive evolution
if the trait was making no contribution to fitness” (Griffiths 1993, p. 417). Regressive
evolution can be defined simply as any change to a character that results because it
no longer plays an adaptive role. In order for an environment to satisfy the temporal
requirement as we have defined it, a character of the same type as C must be present
in population P in the environment for an evolutionarily significant period of time.
However as long as this threshold condition will be met, proper function is awarded to
C, in any organism that is a member of P, that is manifested in the environment. This
means that, as in other SEP accounts, whether or not C has a function at some time t
may depend on what happens during an interval after t.
It is important to note that SEPS does not require that a character of concern be
actively selected for in a given environment. Instead, all that is required is that the
character does not undergo regressive evolution. If this were not so, SEPS would not
be able to handle problem cases like those where selection occurred in the distant past
or where selection occurred for a character that then changed its function over time. On
SEPS, a trait need not be selected for in the recent past as long as the trait confers a sep
and is manifested in a proper environment, that is, an environment that has occurred or
will go on to occur for an evolutionarily significant amount of time. Similarly, SEPS
can successfully handle cases where selection for a character occurred and then this
14 As Bardon notes, such an account assumes the availability of an adequate definition of natural selection
that can be formulated without reference to proper function (see Bardon 2007 p. 58).
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character assumed a new function. All that is required in order for the new function of
such a character to be proper is for it to confer a sep in a proper environment. If this
character loses its function (becomes vestigial) rather than assuming a new function,
it fails to generate a sep and so ceases to have a proper function.
It might be thought that cases where traits are linked would pose more of a problem
for SEPS. However, I think that these too are easily resolvable. In cases where linked
traits both have proper functions, each function must confer a sep in an environment
that occurs for an evolutionarily significant amount of time. However in cases where
only one trait enhances survival, it is likely that, because they are linked, both traits
will persist in the environment for an evolutionarily significant amount of time. Even
so, it is not the case that both traits have a function. This is because, by hypothesis,
only one of the linked traits confers a sep. Because a sep must be conferred and the
temporal requirement must be satisfied for a trait to have a function, SEPS correctly
judges that only one linked trait has a function. This is so in spite of the fact that
no regressive evolution occurs in either case and so both traits satisfy the temporal
requirement.
Unlike the common environment interpretation, which failed because it was unable
to distinguish between accidentally inhabited environments and proper environments
and so wrongly classified instances of serendipitous malfunctions, the temporal
requirement of SEPS only admits long lived circumstances. This lends a greater degree
of stabilization to function, which would otherwise have to be reconsidered at each
change of environment. Because of this, it deals effectively with cases like the trapped
miner whose slow heart rate and respiration confer a sep in a low-oxygen environment.
As we would expect, SEPS classifies these cases as malfunctions because the envi-
ronments in which they generate a sep have not occurred for a long enough duration
and with enough frequency to be considered evolutionarily significant.
This is true also of the lucky houseflies in Sect. 4. Although a sep is generated,
the circumstances in which it occurs are too short lived. SEPS correctly classifies the
lucky flies’ mutations as serendipitous malfunctions. However if the slow and steady
breathing mutation and the perforated tracheal sac mutation both persisted for an
evolutionarily significant amount of time in the fly population, I think that these muta-
tions would count as adaptations all along and not ever as serendipitous malfunctions.
This is so because the temporal requirement of SEPS requires that it be likely that
regressive evolution would have occurred if these mutations didn’t increase fitness.
Because adaptations are just those character changes that increase the fitness of popu-
lations in their proper environments, apparent serendipitous malfunctions that persist
for an evolutionarily significant period of time and so satisfy SEPS seem clearly to be
adaptations and not serendipitous malfunctions at all.
It might be thought that, instead of being too permissive, the temporal requirement
of SEPS is too strict and so requires time periods that are sometimes too long. How-
ever, I think that this objection underestimates the flexibility of SEPS. Like Bardon’s
account, the temporal requirement of SEPS is relativized to the relevant population
P of which O is a member. Because organisms like E. coli reproduce quickly, the
amount of time that must elapse before regressive evolution is expected in this pop-
ulation will be very short and so even comparatively short periods of time will be
evolutionarily significant for these populations. However for organisms like human
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beings with relatively slow rates of reproduction, only long periods of time will be
evolutionarily significant. This flexibility also allows SEPS to take into account all
of the groups that biologists are interested in and not just species, because it places
no restrictions on the size of the population and instead only restricts how long the
character must persist in the population.
To see this, lets return to the pocket mouse example but this time lets consider only
the black pocket mouse for the sake of simplicity. As Dice and Blossom discovered,
the black dorsal pelage of any member of the population of black pocket mice in the
Tularosa Basin confer a sep by reducing predation by avian sight hunters. However, in
order to be considered a proper function under SEPS, the genetic mechanism behind
the black dorsal pelage character must have been present in the population and environ-
ment for a long enough duration and with enough frequency that regressive evolution
would be likely were it making no contribution to fitness. Given that this threshold
will be met, proper function is awarded to any organism in the population that has
manifested the character in this environment. This is true also of both ancestors and
descendants provided that they manifest the character in the same environment. The
time period required depends on specific details concerning the population in ques-
tion and particularly on the size of the population and on the mutation rate at the loci
controlling the trait of interest.
Because of the specificity of the information required by SEPS, it is often quite
difficult to determine proper function with certainty. As a helpful reviewer points out,
it might be thought that this could form the basis of a pragmatic objection against the
account. It is true that even in well-studied cases like the pocket mouse, the genetic
mechanisms of characters like dorsal pelage coloration are still not completely under-
stood. This is enough to prevent us from using SEPS to say with certainty whether
the black dorsal pelage trait is properly functioning. However, in practice I think that
we are willing to settle for less than certainty. In cases like the pocket mouse, we
can be reasonably sure that no regressive evolution is occurring (based on the lack of
diversity we observe in coloration) without needing to fully understand the genetic
mechanisms behind this trait. This is readily observable and should be enough for us
to make function ascriptions with confidence. I stand by SEPS as an analysis of func-
tion but this analysis shouldn’t be seen to have normative implications for biological
practice: biologists often rightly assign function with less evidence then SEPS needs
to guarantee that these function ascriptions are true. For the same reason, SEPS is not
descriptive of the evidence biologists typical gather to support function ascriptions.
Instead, I think that SEPS successfully describes the concept that biologists employ
when appealing to function ascriptions as answers to what questions.
Because SEPS incorporates a selection-based temporal requirement and even makes
use of insights from Griffiths’ Modern History account of function, it might be objected
that it is an etiological account rather than an ahistorical account and so that I have
misrepresented it and its place in the dialectic. As a result, it might be thought that
it is no better suited to answer what questions than any other etiological account.
While my account does contain some backward looking elements, like those found
in the temporal requirement, I think it is clear that SEPS is forward looking in the




The defining feature of ahistorical accounts of function like Bigelow and Pargetter’s
SEP is their analysis of function in terms of possibly nonexistent future events: future
instances of survival by organisms with the character in question in the proper environ-
ment. On ahistorical accounts, functions are subjunctive, dispositional properties of
individuals. They say of individuals what is likely to happen in the right circumstances
as a result of their having a particular character. This defining feature of ahistorical
accounts is preserved by SEPS: if a character is to have a function, it must necessarily
generate a sep in the proper environment. Where SEPS is backward looking, and so
is similar to etiological accounts, is in its specification of the circumstances in which
a sep obtains. Though the backward looking elements of SEPS play this crucial role
in characterizing it, I see no reason why this would cause proper function to lose its
dispositional character as a result. Because SEPS retains the defining feature of ahis-
torical accounts and does not define function in terms of actual survival as etiological
accounts do, I think that SEPS is clearly an ahistorical account. As a result, it is as
well suited to answer what questions as any other ahistorical account.
6 Conclusion
The SEP account of proper function appears to provide the best ahistorical analysis of
function available and so appears to give the best answers to what questions concern-
ing function. However, I have argued that prior specifications of proper environment,
a crucial feature of the SEP account, fail because they are either too permissive or too
restrictive. The common environment interpretation, favored by critics, caused proper
environment to vary wildly and so to admit serendipitous malfunctions. Similarly,
Adrian Bardon’s population-indexed temporal requirement interpretation excluded
groups smaller than species and, when modified to remedy this, also admitted seren-
dipitous malfunctions. This failure poses a significant problem both for proponents of
the SEP account, who find themselves unable to provide an account of proper environ-
ment, and also for friends of functions, who find themselves unable to analyze function
ascriptions as answers to what questions. However, I think that an analysis of proper
environment can be found by way of a selection-based temporal requirement. This
interpretation of proper environment avoids the problems that afflict prior proposals
and so is free of the objections that I raise and, as a result, seems to offer a viable
analysis of proper function.15
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